December 9

[On December 9, 1787, I sent this correspondence from Paris to Charles-Guillaume-Frédéric Dumas, an invaluable secret diplomatic agent who handles American affairs in the Netherlands. I am currently serving as the United States Minister Plenipotentiary to France. This exchange takes place during a critical transitional period back home, where the newly drafted United States Constitution has just been sent to the states for ratification to replace the weak Articles of Confederation. I am advising Dumas to exercise strict reserve and avoid raising commercial treaty expectations in Brussels or elsewhere, explaining that the current Congress is likely hesitant to forge new foreign ties while the entire structure of the federal government is in contemplation of a total reorganization. I point out that back in 1784, Congress proposed highly free commercial principles to all of Europe, but every single power declined the offer except for Prussia.]

By that you have seen all that interference, direct or indirect, on the part of Mr. Adams and myself in the business you had done me the honor to suggest, would be improper. Your despatches for Mr. Jay shall go with mine in the packet of this month. These will bring the matter into the view of Congress. In the meantime I think it would be well to avoid exciting at Brussels or anywhere else the least expectation thereon, because it is impossible for us to know what that body may, in its wisdom and with all circumstances under its eye, decide should be done. They had, in the year 1784, made up their minds as to the system of commercial principles they wished to pursue. These were very free. They proposed them to all the powers of Europe. All declined except Prussia. To this general opposition they may now find it necessary to present a very different general system to which their treaties will form cases of exception, and they may wish to lessen rather than multiply those cases of exception. Add to this, that it is in contemplation to change the organization of the federal government, and they may think it better to leave the system of foreign connection to be formed by those who are to pursue it. I only mention these as possible considerations, without pretending to know the sentiments of that honorable body, or any one of its members on the subject; and to show that no expectations should be raised which might embarrass them or embroil ourselves. The proposed change of government seems to be the proper topic to urge as the reason why Congress may not at this moment choose to be forming new treaties. Should they choose it, on the other hand, the reserve of those who act for them, while uninstructed, cannot do injury.